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Reporter's Privilege and Juvenile Anonymity:
Two Confidentiality Policies on a
Collision Course
Diane Geraghty* and Alan Raphael**

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the course of gathering news for publication, reporters frequently rely on information given to them by sources who do not
wish to be identified.' Over the past twenty-five years, journalists
have been subpoenaed more frequently to appear before grand juries investigating crime and ordered to disclose their confidential
sources.' In Branzburg v. Hayes,3 a closely divided Supreme Court
refused to exempt journalists from the citizen's duty to divulge information relevant to prosecution of a crime. The trend among
courts and commentators in the decade since Branzburg, however,
has been to limit that decision to its facts and to adopt the position
of five Justices in the case. Under that position, the first amendment creates a qualified testimonial privilege for reporters to refuse
to disclose information when requested to do so in criminal or civil
litigation.' In a parallel movement, several state legislatures have
enacted statutes creating an absolute or qualified testimonial privilege for reporters.5
In In re Special GrandJury Investigation of Alleged Violation of
the Juvenile Court Act [hereinafter referred to as Warden]6 , the Illinois Supreme Court addressed for the first time the scope of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.A.
1965, University of California; M.A. 1967, University of Chicago; J.D. 1972, Northwestern University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; B.A.
1966, Haverford; M.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1972, University of Chicago; J.D. 1979, Indiana
University.
1. See Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 229,
239-53 (1971).
2. See infra note 47.
3. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
4. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 48.
6. 104 111. 2d 419 (1984). [hereinafter cited as Warden].
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journalist's privilege in Illinois.7 A newspaper reporter/editor,
Rob Warden, challenged a court order requiring him to disclose to
a grand jury his source for transcripts of juvenile court hearings.
The grand jury was impaneled to investigate unauthorized release
of the transcripts in violation of a state statute protecting the confidentiality of juvenile records.' Warden argued that forced disclosure of his source for the transcripts violated the Illinois Reporter's
Privilege Act9 and the free press guarantees of the federal and state
constitutions. 10

The Illinois Supreme Court in Warden limited its holding to the
narrow issue of whether the circuit court properly divested the reporter of his privilege under the state "shield" law. The court
ruled that divestiture was inappropriate because all other available
sources of the information had not been exhausted as required by
statute. I Language in the opinion, however, raises disturbing questions for the future regarding the degree of protection the court
will recognize for Illinois reporters
called upon to disclose confi2
dential sources of information.1
This article utilizes the Warden case to examine the extent of the
reporter's privilege under the Illinois Reporter's Privilege Act and
the federal Constitution. In Warden, the circuit court had ordered
the reporter to disclose his source for juvenile court transcripts in
7. The reporter's statutory privilege is set forth in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
8-901
to -909 (1983).
8. The alleged crimes which the grand jury was impaneled to investigate are official
misconduct (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 33-3 (1983)) and removal or destruction of public
records (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 32-8 (1983)). On January 17, 1984, DuPage County
Circuit Court Chief Judge Bruce Fawell ordered a special grand jury to be impaneled.
See In re Alleged Violations of the Juvenile Court Act, No. MR-10, Order to Impanel
Special Grand Jury. In an earlier order, the chief judge had appointed a special prosecutor to investigate allegations regarding improper disclosure of transcripts contained in a
resolution of the local bar association. In re Alleged Violations of the Juvenile Court
Act, Miscellaneous Order Nos. 84-2, 84 MR-10 (Jan. 9, 1984). The bar association's
resolution called for the appointment of a special prosecutor because "the significant
question of the identity of the person or persons who furnished transcripts of those proceedings to the Judicial Inquiry Board, the media or other person has not been resolved
. .. ."Resolution Adopted by Directors of DuPage County Bar Association, p. 1 (Dec.
9, 1983).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
8-901 to -909 (1983). See infra notes 52-60.
10. The United States Constitution guarantees "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Illi-

nois Constitution provides that "[a]ll persons may speak, write and publish freely, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 4. A discussion of the
impact of the Illinois constitutional provision on the outcome in Warden is beyond the
scope of this article.
11. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 428.
12. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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order to protect the integrity of the state's policy of juvenile confidentiality. A cornerstone of juvenile justice philosophy has been
the belief that the rehabilitative goals of the system can best be
accomplished if the child's identity is known only to those directly
involved in the rehabilitative process. To that end, all states have
some form of juvenile confidentiality policy. 13 Such a policy creates an inevitable conflict between the child's right to anonymity
and the public's right to information regarding the operation of its
courts. It is that conflict and its appropriate resolution which this
article seeks to address.
This article will focus on the competing confidentiality policies
in Warden. First, it will present the factual setting in Warden and
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision denying divestiture. Next, it
will examine the reporter's claim under the Illinois Reporter's
Privilege Act and the first amendment. The article traces the role
of confidentiality in juvenile courts and analyzes the importance of
the public's right of access to information regarding judicial proceedings. Alternatives for protecting the confidentiality of
juveniles without undue limitations on the press are explored. Finally, the article concludes that both the state shield law and the
first amendment create a qualified privilege for newsmen, and that,
under the facts in Warden, the public's interest in obtaining information regarding juvenile proceedings outweighs the state's interest in preserving juvenile confidentiality.

II.

THE FACTUAL SETTING

In May, 1981, two Chicago journalists, Rob Warden of Chicago
Lawyer, and James Warren, a Chicago Sun-Times reporter, received transcripts of two juvenile dispositional hearings held in
March, 1981. The transcripts contained racially-oriented language, sexual comments, and profanity spoken by a juvenile court
judge during the hearings.' 4 The transcripts were referred to in
13. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979).
14. On March 25, 1981, Judge Teschner, a circuit court judge in DuPage County,
Illinois, held a dispositional hearing to determine if Nancy A. should be sent to a juvenile
institution. The following conversation took place between the court and Nancy A.
The Court: Temporary placement with Pat and Lisa B. is authorized. Nancy,
you're making a deal with me.
The Court:
your grades.
Nancy A.:
The Court:
Nancy A.:

But you're still sixteen. No pot. No booze; not even beer. Keep
You complete the school. Will you promise me that?
Yes .....
You prove yourself.
I will.
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Warren's "Law Memo" column and were quoted in an article written by Warden. 5 Neither newspaper disclosed the names of the
juveniles involved in the proceedings.
Before the Chicago Lawyer article was published, the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board had begun an investigation of the judge's conduct. The Board filed a complaint with the Illinois Courts
Commission alleging that the juvenile judge's conduct tended to
bring his office into disrepute. 6 The Commission dismissed the
complaint in August, 1983." 7
After the dismissal, the local bar association passed a resolution
requesting the chief judge of the circuit court to appoint a special
prosecutor to investigate the release of the transcripts in alleged
violation of the Juvenile Court Act.' 8 In response to this request,
the chief judge appointed a special prosecutor and impaneled a
grand jury to investigate disclosure of the transcripts.' 9
Reporters Warren and Warden were called to testify before the
grand jury. Warren told the grand jury that he had no knowledge
The Court: If you fuck up, if I read about you in the paper, I can be mean too.
Patrick L. appeared before Judge Teschner on March 26, 1981, for a dispositional
hearing. The following is part of that hearing:
The Court: Hey, you know where that is heading? You know what the judges
do with the people who don't take responsibility for themselves?
Patrick L.: Put them in jail.
The Court: . . . .but you got to be willing to help yourself and take responsibility for yourself.
If you're not, you can't do it there, you're seventeen. Then it's isolation.
And the facts of life are, you're a slight, white male. And the prisons are full of
big, black people. And if you were going to the Department of Corrections, the
facts of life are you'll have one in your mouth and one in your ass.
The Court: Get your shit together. It's the first day of the rest of your life my
friend. Change your mind right now that you're going to not hurt anybody,
invade anybody else, and you're going to be responsible to yourself. Make that
decision.
Illinois Court's Commission, Complaint filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board against Circuit Judge John S. Teschner of the Circuit Court of DuPage County, August 3, 1983,
Final Order, Exhibit B at 7-10.
15. Warren's Sun-Times article appeared May 18, 1981. Warden's article appeared
in the June, 1981 publication of Chicago Lawyer.
16. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 421-22. The transcripts supplied to the Board were not
only of the March 25 and March 26, 1981, hearings, quoted supra note 14, but also were
of two other hearings before Judge Teschner.
17. Id. at 422.
18. Id.
19. Id. The State's Attorney's office petitioned first the circuit court and then the
Illinois Supreme Court to rescind the orders appointing a special prosecutor and impaneling a grand jury. Both petitions were denied. Id.
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of the source of the transcripts.2 ° Warden, however, admitted
knowing the source, but declined to reveal it, invoking his privilege
under the Illinois Reporter's Privilege Act ("the Act").2 The special prosecutor then moved to divest Warden of the privilege, a
procedure authorized under the Act.22 The divestiture application
asserted a public interest in the grand jury's "full and fair investigation" into violations of both the Juvenile Court Act and the Illinois Criminal Code.23 The application further maintained that the
source of the transcripts supplied to Warden was not known to the
local state's attorney's office, the judge who ordered their transcription, or the court reporter who transcribed them.24 Finally, it
alleged that there were no alternative sources who could provide
the information sought by the grand jury.25
A.

The Circuit Court Decision

In ruling on the application for divestiture, the circuit court interpreted the Act as allowing it to consider the possibility of alternative means of obtaining the desired information.26 It concluded,
however, that all other reasonably available sources of the information sought from Warden had been investigated without avail.27
The court emphasized that the public interest in juvenile record
confidentiality is established by law. 21 It acknowledged that Warden had not divulged the juvenile's name, but found a public interest in the confidentiality of juvenile transcripts regardless of
whether the confidentiality of the juvenile's identity had been
20. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 423. Warren testified that he received the transcripts "in a
brown envelope without a return address or cover letter, and that he did not know the
identity of the person who sent them." Id.
21. Id. The Illinois Reporter's Privilege Act is found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
8-901 to -909 (1983). See infra notes 52-60.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, T 8-903. See infra notes 54, 55.
23. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Juvenile
Court Act, No. MR-10 (Circuit Court of DuPage County, filed April 25, 1984), Application to Divest Reporter's Privilege at 3-4.
24. Id. at 3-4.
25. Id. at 4.
26. The court conceded that T 8-907(2), which states a requirement "that all other
available sources were exhausted" appears to convey a "strong legislative intent." In re
Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Juvenile Court Act, No. 84MR- 10, slip op. at 1 (Circuit Court of DuPage County May 23, 1984). It held, however,
that the preceding paragraph 1 8-906, dilutes some of the absolutism implied in 1 8907(2), thereby allowing a trial court some latitude in determining the exhaustion issue.
Id. at 2. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 11 8-906, 8-907(2) (1983).
27. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Juvenile
Court Act, No. 84-MR-10, slip op. at 3 (Circuit Court of DuPage County May 23, 1984).
28. Id.
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breached.29 The opinion suggested that the public interest in the
operations of the juvenile court could have been furthered under
state law by Warden's attendance at court, thereby avoiding "the
commission of a crime" by whoever provided the juvenile trial
transcripts to Warden without court authorization.30 The court
concluded that the only manner in which the state's policy of juvenile confidentiality could have been protected was through the divestiture of Warden's privilege and compulsion of his testimony.3"
It found no reporter's privilege protection in either the federal or
state constitutions.32
B. The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
Warden appealed this divestiture order directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court. 33 The court analyzed the provisions of the Re29. Id. The court appeared to view any articulable public interest as sufficient to
justify divestiture under the Act.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 4.
33. The order was appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court pursuant to Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 302(b). Although the court ordered the parties to brief the question
of whether the circuit court order divesting Warden of his reporter's privilege is a final
and appealable order, the opinion.contains no discussion of the appealability issue. In re
Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violation of the Juvenile Court Act, No.
60318 slip. op. (Ill. S. Ct. June 28, 1984) (order directing parties to address the issue of
finality).
Appeals are allowed as of right from final judgments and from interlocutory orders as
provided by rules of the Supreme Court. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; Ill. S. Ct. Rules
301, 307, 308. The present action did not fall within the classes of interlocutory appeals
allowed under Rules 307 and 308. Accordingly, the question of appealability was
whether the circuit court ruling was a final judgment from which appeal would be allowed as of right pursuant to Rule 301.
The Illinois Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal as not properly before the court in
an earlier case involving the reporter's shield law. In People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 89
Ill. App. 3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d 692 (1st Dist. 1980), rev'd, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 429 N.E.2d 483
(1981), the circuit court ordered a reporter to appear at a deposition and answer questions relating to a pending suit instituted by the Attorney General's office. The reporter
appealed on the basis of the Reporter's Privilege Act and the free press guarantees of the
state and federal constitutions.
The appellate court reversed the circuit court's order. People ex reL Scott v. Silverstein, 89 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d 692 (1st Dist. 1980), rev'd, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 429
N.E.2d 483 (1981). It found the order to appear for deposition final and appealable as of
right, because it "finally determined the rights of the parties before it and terminated the
litigation" between the reporter and the defendant who sought his deposition. Id. at
1042, 412 N.E.2d at 694 (quoting Laurent v. Brelji, 74 11. App. 3d 214, 392 N.E.2d 929
(4th Dist. 1979)). For a discussion of the Silverstein appellate court's analysis of the
merits of the claimed privilege, see infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, interpreting the trial court's order as "a preliminary order in a pending suit," and hence not appealable. People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87 Ill. 2d 167, 173, 429 N.E.2d 483, 486 (1981). The reporter clearly would be
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porter's Privilege Act which permit divestiture of a reporter's privilege when "all other available sources of information have been
exhausted and disclosure of the information sought
is essential to
34
the protection of the public interest involved."

In reversing the circuit court's divestiture order, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that the lower court erred in finding
that all other available sources of information had been exhausted.3 5 The court reviewed the grand jury testimony and noted
that five attorneys reportedly had possessed the relevant trial transcripts, but that only one of the five had been asked to appear
before the grand jury. 36 To determine whether all available sources
for the information had been questioned, the court looked to standards applied in other jurisdictions and found that every jurisdiction recognizing a qualified privilege for reporters requires a
showing of exhaustion of other available sources before divestiture
is required. 7 Instead of expressly adopting other states' standards,
however, the court fashioned its own definition of "available
sources." It found a "clear legislative intent" in enacting the Reporter's Privilege Act to "create a standard which balances the reporter's first amendment rights against the public interest in the
information sought and the practical difficulties in obtaining the
information elsewhere. ' 3 Applying this balancing test to the facts
in Warden, the court concluded that the other four attorneys
should have been called to testify before the grand jury.39 In so
holding, the court rejected any suggestion that divestiture may be
allowed merely upon "a showing of inconvenience to the
investigator. " 4

Although the court dismissed the divestiture order on the
allowed to appeal, however, if he refused to obey the discovery order and was adjudged in
contempt. Id. at 174, 429 N.E.2d at 487.
In Warden, the only ongoing action was the grand jury investigation. Warden had not
been found in contempt for refusing to answer questions before the grand jury. Because
the Illinois Supreme court in Warden made no mention of this issue and did not refer to
its Silverstein decision, it is difficult to determine whether Silverstein has been overruled,
distinguished, or restricted to its particular facts.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-907(2) (1983).
35. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 428 (I11.
S. Ct. Nov. 30, 1984).
36. Id. at 422-23, 428.
37. Id. at 425.
38. Id. at 427. It is uncertain whether the court refers to "first amendment rights"
with the intention of basing the Act on federal constitutional requirements or is simply
using the phrase as a convenient shorthand reference to the legislature's intention in enacting the statute.
39. Id. at 428.
40. Id. at 428-29.
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grounds that available sources had not been called before the grand
jury, it noted in dictum that it agreed with the circuit court that "a
compelling public interest will be served by ascertaining the person
or persons who violated
the confidentiality provisions of the Juve41
Act."
Court
nile
Because of the factual basis for the reversal in Warden, the court
did not consider the constitutional free press argument advanced
by the petitioner. It acknowledged, however, that the first amendment protects the right of the press to gather and disseminate information,4 2 and, at one point, appeared to recognize that freedom
of the press can be compromised by compelled disclosure of a reporter's confidential sources.43 At another point, the court also
quoted approvingly what it viewed as the rule of Branzburg v.
Hayes,44 as "permitting forced disclosure of the reporter's source
when the public interest in the information is sufficiently
compelling.41
It is not clear whether the court's references to the first amendment suggest that analysis of the compelled disclosure issue is identical under the constitution and the Illinois Reporter's Privilege
Act, or whether it viewed the first amendment merely as a helpful
analogy in determining the rights of journalists under the state
statute.
Justice Simon concurred in the majority opinion. He disagreed,
however, with the majority's acknowledgement of a compelling
public interest in the case. Noting that the public interest in juvenile confidentiality was not implicated because no juvenile's name
was released, Justice Simon concluded that the Act should not be
'46
used "to shield a judge rather than a juvenile.
III.

ILLINOIS REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE ACT

A.

History and Purpose

Reporters have long asserted that it is necessary, in order to
meet their responsibilities as newsgatherers, for them to receive information from confidential sources and to respect the source's
41. Id. at 425. Justice Simon disagreed with this dictum. Id. at 429-30. See infra
note 46 and accompanying text.
42. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 424.
43. Id.
44. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
45. Warden, 104 I11.2d at 424.
46. Id. at 430 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
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confidence by not disclosing his or her identity.4 7 In recognition of
the reporter's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of sources,
the majority of states have established, through statutes and court
opinions, an evidentiary privilege protecting a reporter from forced
disclosure of sources. 48 Although adoption of the privilege in some
47. The reporter's concern for protecting the identity of sources was present in colonial America:
I. One of the Pieces in our News-Paper, on some political Point which I have
now forgotten, gave Offence to the Assembly. He was taken up, censur'd and
imprison'd for a Month by the Speaker's Warrant, I suppose because he would
not discover his Author. I too was taken up and examin'd before the Council;
but tho' I did not give them any Satisfaction, they contented themselves with
admonishing me, and dismiss'd me; considering me perhaps as an Apprentice
who was bound to keep his Master's Secrets.
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 69 (Yale Univ. Press 1964).
In 1934, the American Newspaper Guild first addressed the issue of protecting confidential sources by including in its Code of Ethics the requirement "[t]hat newspapermen
shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court
or before other judicial or investigatory bodies." J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK
OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 414 (1979). Sigma Delta Chi, the journalistic fraternity, provides in its Code of Ethics that "fj]ournalists acknowledge the newsman's ethics
of protecting confidential sources of information." Id.
Government requests for reporters to testify regarding sources of their information
increased substantially in the late 1960's and early 1970's as a result of governmental
response to civil rights and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and activities. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra, at 416-19; W. FRANCOIS, MASS LAW & REGULATION 400-01
(3d ed. 1982); H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS: FREEDOM
AND CONTROL OF PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA 356-57 (4th ed. 1982); Blasi, supra
note 1, at 254; Note, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg." The Case for a Federal
Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160, 162-64 (1976) [hereinafter cited as U.C.L.A.
Note]. Prior to 1965, fewer than 40 reported cases referred to a reporter's refusal to
testify when subpoenaed. By contrast, 124 subpoenas were served on either CBS or NBC
between 1969 and 1971, and the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago Daily News received 30 subpoenas within an 18-month period. H. NELSON & D. TEETER, supra, at
356; U.C.L.A. Note, supra, at 162 n.13 (citations omitted).
The Justice Department under President Nixon served numerous subpoenas on newspapers, television stations, and reporters regarding demonstrations and police beatings of
reporters during the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago: "The government served
subpoenas on all four major Chicago daily newspapers, the three major television networks and NEWSWEEK, TIME and LIFE magazines, calling for all their notes, film footage, stories, rough drafts and anything else in their possession that might be connected
with the Democratic National Convention." U.C.L.A. Note, supra, at 162. See also W.
FRANCOIS,

48.

supra, at 400.

Twenty-six states have shield statutes: ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1975); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.25.150 -.220 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1977); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977 Replacement); CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1070 (West Supp. 1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
8-901 to -909
(1983); IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1969);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-1454 (West Supp. 1978); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980 Repl. Vol.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(l) (Callaghan 1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021 -.025 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901
to -903 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49275 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.84a-21 to -21.7 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT.
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states followed and apparently responded to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes,49 the shield
law concept dates back to 1896 when Maryland adopted a reporter's privilege. 50
B.

The Illinois Act

Since 1971 Illinois has provided a statutory qualified privilege
for reporters to refuse to disclose sources of information requested
in the course of litigation.5 Under the Illinois Reporter's Privilege
ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04, .12 (Page Supp.
1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1978); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 44.510 -.540 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 19781979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-1 to .1-3 (Supp. 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208

(Supp. 1977).
Courts in several states have found a reporter's privilege under common law or under a
state or federal constitutional protection. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951, 956
(Fla. 1976) (Branzburg test); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978) (federal and state constitutions); Opinion of the Justices,
117 N.H. 386, 389, 373 A.2d 644, 646-47 (1977) (state constitutional and common law
privileges in civil proceedings); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 271, 315 A.2d 254, 256
(1974) (federal constitution); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d
429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) (federal and state constitutions); Senear v.
Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 155, 641 P.2d 1180, 1182-83 (1982) (common
law qualified privilege in civil cases); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wisc. 2d 601, 617-619, 266
N.W.2d 279, 286-87 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Dean, 103 Wisc. 2d 228,
307 N.W.2d 628 (1981) (state constitution).
49. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). At the time the Supreme Court decided Branzburg, there
were 17 states providing statutory protection to newspersons from divulging sources. Id.
at 689 n.27 (1972). For a discussion of the Branzburg decision, see infra notes 92-116 and
accompanying text.
50. 1896 Md. Laws ch. 249, now codified at MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9112 (1980 Repl. Vol.). Enactment of the Maryland law followed imprisonment of a Baltimore Sun reporter, John T. Morris, who refused to answer grand jury questions regarding the source of his 1896 article about alleged gambling payoffs to elected officials and
policemen. Following Morris's refusal to testify and subsequent five-day imprisonment,
the Maryland General Assembly passed a shield law. Tofani v. State, 297 Md. 165, 465
A.2d 413 (1983). Morris is said to have justified his refusal to answer the grand jury
questions on the grounds that a newspaper reporter "never betrays those who give him
their confidence." Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 717 n.2, 294 A.2d 149, 152 n.2,
affd, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
51. Reporter's Privilege Act, P.A. 77-1623, effective Sept. 23, 1971. Governor Richard Ogilvie of Illinois, upon signing the bill into law, explained its purpose:
This bill takes a small, but vital, step toward guaranteeing the freedom of the
press underpinning our constitutional liberties. It allows reporters in Illinois to
perform their tasks without undue harassment from overzealous policemen anxious to take advantage of their hard work.
But it is more than a declaration of fair play for newsmen. It also assures a
better informed public, for it allows reporters to seek the truth wherever it is to
be found, without the fear that their sources of information will be cut off by
unnecessary disclosure.
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Act, courts are prohibited from compelling disclosure of "the
source of any information obtained by a reporter during the course
".."52 The privilege is inapplicable to
of his or her employment .
a libel or slander action in which a reporter or news medium is a
defendant. "
This statute creates a qualified privilege rather than an absolute
privilege.5 4 One seeking to divest a reporter of the statutory privilege is required to apply to the circuit court of the county hearing
the underlying action for an order of divestiture and an order to
the reporter to disclose the source of the information.55 The application to divest must provide basic factual information about the
matter, indicate the specific information sought and its relevancy
to the proceedings, and demonstrate the "specific public interest"
which would be harmed by non-disclosure.5 6 The court must then
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 24, 1971, p. 8, col. 1. The Act is codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, 7 8-901 to -909 (1983).
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-901 provides:
No court may compel any person to disclose the source of any information
obtained by a reporter during the course of his or her employment except as
provided in Part 9 of Article VIII of this Act. The privilege conferred by these
Sections is not available in any libel or slander action in which a reporter or
news medium is a party defendant.
"Reporter" is defined in the statute as "any person regularly engaged in the business of
collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news medium; and includes
any person who was a reporter at the time the information sought was procured or obtained." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-902(a) (1983). "News medium" is defined as "any
newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals and having a paid general circulation; a news service; a radio station; a television station; a community antenna television
service; and any person or corporation engaged in the making of news reels or other
motion picture news for public showing." Id. at 8-902(b). "Source" is defined as "the
person or means from or through which the news or information was obtained." Id. at
8-902(c).
Arguably this statute excludes, probably unintentionally, news gatherers working occasionally for sporadically issued publications or for publications issued without cost. For
other states' more inclusive coverage under shield laws, see, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-3-5-1
(1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20144 to -147 (1983).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-901 (1983).
54. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-903 (1983) provides:
In any case where a person claims the privilege conferred by Part 9 of Article
VIII of this Act, the person or party, body or officer seeking the information so
privileged may apply in writing to the circuit court serving the county where
the hearing, action or proceeding in which the information is sought for an
order divesting the person named therein of such privilege and ordering him or
her to disclose his or her source of the information.
55. Id.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-904 (1983) dictates the requirements for an application for divestiture:
The application provided in Section 8-903 of this Act shall allege: the name
of the reporter and of the news medium with which he or she was connected at
the time the information sought was obtained; the specific information sought
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rule on divestiture in light of four factors: the nature of the proceedings; the merits of the claim or defense; the adequacy of other
remedies; and the availability of alternative means of acquiring the
information sought. 7 The court must hold a hearing and, if it
grants an order of divestiture, is required to make findings that the
information sought is not required by any other law to be kept
secret, that it is not available from sources other than the reporter,
and that disclosure is "essential to the protection of the public interest involved."5 " A divestiture order is enforceable by contempt,59 but the privilege continues during pendency of an
appeal. 6°
Although the shield law was enacted more than ten years ago,
there are few reported Illinois cases addressing its provisions. This
paucity of cases may reflect various factors. Reporters in Illinois
may not have been requested often to disclose sources.6 When
requested, some reporters may have refused to divulge sources and
the party or governmental body decided not to seek the information under the provisions of the Act. In other instances, reporters
may have divulged the information voluntarily. Unlike other evidentiary privileges such as those involving doctor-patient and lawyer-client relationships, the reporter's privilege belongs to the
reporter alone and may be waived by the reporter without any conand its relevancy to the proceedings; and, a specific public interest which would
be adversely affected if the factual information sought were not disclosed.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-906 (1983) provides:
In granting or denying divestiture of the privilege provided in Part 9 of Article VIII of this Act the court shall have due regard to the nature of the proceedings, the merits of the claim or defense, the adequacy of the remedy otherwise
available, if any, the relevancy of the source, and the possibility of establishing
by other means that which it is alleged the source requested will tend to prove.
58. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-907 (1983):
An order granting divestiture of the privilege provided in Part 9 of Article
VIII of this Act shall be granted only if the court, after hearing the parties,
finds:
(1) that the information sought does not concern matters, or details in any
proceeding, required to be kept secret under the laws of this State or of the
Federal government; and
(2) that all other available sources of information have been exhausted and
disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public
interest involved.
If the court enters an order divesting the person of the privilege granted in
Part 9 of Article VIII of this Act it shall also order the person to disclose the
information it has determined should be disclosed.
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-909 (1983).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-908 (1983).
61. A review of other states reveals few cases interpreting shield laws, so the lack of
Illinois cases is probably not a result of local factors.
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sideration of the wishes of the source.62 Although it is possible that
some divestiture orders have not been appealed or reported, this is
unlikely in light of the vigor with which news media generally defend their rights against governmental action.
The Appellate Court of Illinois addressed the underlying policy
of the shield act in People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein.63 It analyzed
the purpose of the Act, the scope of its protections, the possibility
of waiver of the privilege, and its relationship to constitutional free
press guarantees. 6 The case arose out of a proceeding by the Attorney General of Illinois against a museum and its directors. One
of the directors subpoenaed a Chicago Tribune reporter to appear
for a deposition and to produce certain documents regarding stories he had written for the Tribune about questionable sales of art
objects by the museum. The reporter had made disclosures regarding the museum's activities to a special assistant attorney general
involved in the state's suit. These conversations occurred both
prior to and after the state filed its legal action.65 The reporter
moved to quash the subpoena as violative of his privilege.
In denying the motion to quash, the circuit court held that the
reporter's conversations with the special assistant attorney general
constituted a waiver of his reporter's privilege. It then ordered him
to answer questions at the deposition; however, these questions
were limited to the matters that had been divulged in the attorney
general's office. 66 The parties conceded, and the court agreed, that
absent a finding of waiver the defendant seeking to depose the reporter did not meet the divestiture requirements of the Act.6 7
The appellate court described the Act as reflecting "a paramount
public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and
62. See C. MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE §§ 76.2, 77, 88, 89, 92, 93, 102 (3d ed. E.
Cleary 1984); Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 37, 89-90 (1980), and cases cited therein.
Evidence scholars have generally been critical of evidentiary privileges because they
exclude trustworthy evidence from the trier of fact. C. MCCORMICK, supra; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2184a, 2192 (McNoughton rev. 1961).
63. 89 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 412 N.E.2d 692 (1st Dist. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 87
Ill. 2d 167, 429 N.E.2d 483 (1981). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the grounds
that the trial court's order was not final and appealable. See supra note 33. Given this
reversal, the appellate court's discussion may have no precedential value. Nonetheless, it
was the only reported case prior to Warden which discussed the purpose of this Act.
64. Id. at 1042-44, 412 N.E.2d at 694-95.
65. Id. at 1040-41, 412 N.E.2d at 693.
66. Id. at 1040, 412 N.E.2d at 693.
67. Id. at 1042, 412 N.E.2d at 694. The court did not discuss the state or federal
constitutional arguments raised by the reporter because "it is clear this act incorporates
the guarantees of a free press under the first amendment to the United States Constitution
and under article 1, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970." Id.
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independent press capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters .
"...68 It indicated that the
Act's protection of "the source of the information ' 69 encompassed
both confidential and non-confidential sources. The court interpreted "source" broadly to include a reporter's resource materials.70 It reasoned that the reporter's disclosures to the Attorney
General did not result in a waiver because the reporter's privilege,
unlike other evidentiary privileges, is not dependent upon confidentiality.7 The court further noted that, regardless of whether a
source was confidential, enforcement of subpoenas against a reporter would have a " 'chilling effect' .

tion to the press and to the

on the flow of informa-

public."72

68. Id. at 1043, 412 N.E.2d at 695, quoting Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778,
782 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973). Baker affirmed a trial court's order
that a Chicago reporter was not required to identify the sources of a SATURDAY EVENING POST article to plaintiffs in a civil suit alleging racial discrimination in the Chicago
housing market. Id. at 783. Although the Baker court looked to the policies underlying
the shield laws of New York and Illinois, the decision was based upon the free press
guarantee of the first amendment, and not upon state laws. Id. at 782-83.
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 8-901 (1983).
70. Silverstein, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1043, 412 N.E.2d at 695. Decisions in other states
have similarly defined "source" to include documents and materials in the newsgatherer's
possession. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); People v. Marahan,
81 Misc. 2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1975); State v. Boiardo, 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14
(1980).
71. Silverstein, 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1043, 1044, 412 N.E.2d at 695. "[T]o find that [he]
waived his privilege, simply because he revealed some of his sources to the special Assistant Attorney General, would defeat the express purpose of this legislation." Id. at 1044,
412 N.E.2d at 696.
72. Id. at 1043, 412 N.E.2d at 695 (quoting Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy
Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1978)). Gulliver's Periodicals involved an attempt in a civil antitrust action to compel a Chicago Reader reporter to
identify his sources for an article regarding the plaintiff's alleged difficulties in establishing a magazine and newspaper distributorship in Chicago. The court rendered its decision on first amendment grounds, however, and not on the basis of the Reporter's
Privilege Act. 455 F. Supp. at 1200, 1201 (citations omitted). But see Gutierrez v. Shafer, 9 MED. L. RPTR. 1054, 1054 (Cook County Circuit Court 1982) (decided on first
amendment grounds, but suggesting that the Illinois Reporter's Privilege Act extended
protections only to sources and not to information obtained by the reporter).
In Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, affid, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d
212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973), a Maryland court interpreted a state shield
law, MD. Crs & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1980 Repl. Vol.), which, like the
Illinois Act, does not specify whether the reporter's shield extends to non-confidential as
well as confidential sources. The Lightman court determined that the purpose of the Act
would be served by extending the privilege against disclosure to all sources used by reporters, whether confidential or not:
The statute, on its face, does not purport to protect a newsman from disclosing
only such sources of news or information published by him that was received in
the course of a confidential newsman-informant relationship. On the contrary,
while the Legislature may have enacted the statute with the primary purpose in
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On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court's
order requiring the reporter to appear for deposition was not final
and appealable.73 Having reversed for this reason, the court did
not address
the merits of the substantive issues or the issue of
4
waiver.

Prior to the decision in Warden, People v. Childers7 5 was the
only Illinois authority addressing divestiture under the Reporter's
Privilege Act. The defendant in Childers argued that the trial
court committed reversible error when it failed to divest a reporter
of the privilege in response to the defendant's request. The reporter had written an article which stated that Childers had confessed to three murders after a fourteen-hour interrogation.
Childers argued that his confession was involuntary because of the
length of the interrogation and other factors. Evidence before the
court indicated that the defendant was in police custody for twelve
and one-half hours before confessing to the murders.76
The circuit court trying the murder case denied the motion for
divestiture. 7 The appellate court affirmed, concluding that other
sources were available for the information sought from the remind of protecting the identity of newsmen's confidential sources, we think the
statutory privilege broad enough to encompass any source of news or information, without regard to whether the source gave his information in confidence or
not. Consequently, it is for the newsman to determine whether he will disclose
the "source" of his news or information, and such disclosure cannot be compelled by requiring that he answer questions aimed, directly or indirectly, toward ascertaining the source's identity.
Id. at 724-25, 294 A.2d at 156 (footnote omitted). The Lightman court, however, affirmed the contempt judgment against the reporter because he refused to answer grand
jury questions about criminal activity which the reporter personally witnessed. Id. at
726, 294 A.2d at 157. But cf People v. Wolf, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1972)
(required that information be imparted to the reporter under a cloak of confidentiality in
order for New York shield law to be applicable). The Warden court did not discuss this
issue and thus appears to have adopted the position that a reporter need not assert that
the source wished to remain confidential in order for the reporter to claim the privilege
under the Act.
73. 87 Ill. 2d 167, 171, 429 N.E.2d 483, 485 (1981). See supra note 33 for a discussion of the appealability of the order in the Warden case.
74. Id.
75. 94 Ill. App. 3d 104, 418 N.E.2d 959 (3d Dist. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947
(1982). The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Warden made no reference to Childers
or any other Illinois decisions.
76. During that time, he first told police that he had not been in the house where the
murders occurred and later said that he was there and found the bodies of his mother,
stepfather, and brother. Id. at 108-09, 418 N.E.2d at 962.
77. The court applied 8-907(2) of the Act, and concluded that divestiture was not
warranted because all available sources had not been exhausted. Id. at 112, 418 N.E.2d
at 965.
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porter. 78 Because of the availability of other sources, the Childers
court followed the Act in denying the request for divestiture and
was "essential to the
did not need to address whether disclosure
79
involved."
interest
public
the
of
protection
C.

The Warden Interpretation of the Shield Law

In Warden, the Illinois Supreme Court properly read the Act as
allowing divestiture if two requirements are met: first, that other
sources of information be exhausted and second, that "the information sought [be] essential to the protection of the public interest
involved." 0 The court's adoption of a balancing test to determine
the existence of alternative sources of information sought from a
reporter recognizes the inappropriateness of requiring exhaustion
of every conceivable peripheral source of information but requires
more than a "showing of inconvenience to the investigator before a
The
"8,1
reporter can be compelled to disclose his sources ....
test balances "the reporter's first amendment rights against the
public interest in the information sought and the practical difficulties in obtaining the information elsewhere." 2
Application of the test in Warden logically led the court to find
non-exhaustion. This is because the grand jury failed to contact
four attorneys who were identified by name as having had access to
the transcripts, who had a logical possibility of providing relevant
information to the grand jury, and who apparently were available
to testify.
The scope of the court's test, nevertheless, is imprecise and will
become clear only after being applied in other cases. The greater
the likelihood that an alternative source can provide the information sought or can provide relevant material leading to the information sought, the less likely that disclosure will be ordered. The
prong of the test regarding "the public interest in the information
sought" may indicate that a less exhaustive search for alternative
78. Id. With respect to the other sources, the court indicated that defense counsel
had not asked any police officers about the length of the interrogation, that defendant had
never claimed that the interrogation had lasted for fourteen hours, and that defendant's
fiancee and her mother had been present at the police station all day but had not testified
that a fourteen-hour period had elapsed. Id. The Childers court's interpretation of the
exhaustion requirement appears consistent with the test created by the Warden court.
79. See People v. Childers, 94 Ill. App. 3d 104, 418 N.E.2d 959 (3d Dist. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 947 (1982). The court did indicate that "it is difficult to perceive what
public interest might be involved." Id. at 112, 418 N.E.2d at 965.
80. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 425 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 8-907 (2)(1983)).
81. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 428-29.
82. Id. at 427.
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sources will be required as the public interest increases. The
court's inclusion of first amendment considerations in the required
balancing test suggests that the extent of harm to first amendment
interests from disclosure of the source will affect the determination
of how extensive the search for alternative sources should be. If no
alternative sources exist, however, the only remaining question
under the statute is whether there is a public interest requiring
disclosure.
Although the court found that the exhaustion requirement was
not met, it concluded "that a compelling public interest will be
served by ascertaining the person or persons who violated the confidentiality of the Juvenile Court Act."' 83 Because this sentence is

the only discussion of the "public interest" prong of the divestiture
statute, it is unclear whether the supreme court accepted the circuit court's apparent reading of the Act that any articulable public
interest is sufficient to satisfy the "essential to the public interest"
requirement.84 Under such an interpretation, divestiture would be
required whenever any public interest would be served and no alternative sources exist for the information possessed by the
reporter.
Alternatively, the court's language may be read as permitting
forced disclosure of a journalist's source only when no alternative
sources exist and the public interest in the information is "compelling." Use of the term "compelling" may suggest that, in interpreting the Act, the court intended to utilize, either directly or by
analogy, traditional first amendment principles of analysis. Under
this approach, a state may curtail freedom of speech or the press
only when it can demonstrate a compelling state interest in doing
so. 85 Further supporting this interpretation of the court's opinion

is the fact that the court had earlier cited Branzburg v. Hayes86 as
allowing disclosure of a reporter's source "when the public interest
in the information is sufficiently compelling. "87
If the court's opinion is interpreted in this manner, then the
question of whether "information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest involved" would be resolved by weighing
the importance of protecting the reporter's right to gather and disseminate information against the importance of the public interest
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 425.
See supra note 29.
See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Warden, 104 Il. 2d at 424.
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to be served by disclosure. Under the facts of Warden, this would
involve balancing the state's interest in discovering the source of
confidential juvenile court transcripts in a grand jury proceeding
against the social utility of protecting a journalist's source for information highly relevant to the public's right to be informed about
the behavior of its judiciary. As discussed below, this is the same
test used to determine the scope of a reporter's privilege under the
first amendment. 8
Utilizing a balancing test regarding the public interest would effectuate the legislature's intention in enacting the Illinois shield
law. The Reporter's Privilege Act was designed to "assure a better
informed public . . . ."' In Warden, the court relied on this legislative objective in creating a balancing test to determine whether
the "all available sources" requirement under the Act was met.90 It
seems logical to conclude that this same legislative intention is applicable in interpreting the "essential to the public interest" standard for divestiture. A balancing test is more consistent with the
goal of assuring a better informed public than a statutory test
which would require compelled disclosure of a reporter's source
upon a mere showing that some public interest in the information
is involved.
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMPELLED DISCLOSURE

The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Warden leaves unresolved the degree of overlap between protections afforded reporters under the state shield law and the federal constitution. If the
Illinois Reporter's Privilege Act is interpreted as providing journalists a qualified privilege which can be divested upon showing a
lack of alternative available sources and an articulable public interest in the information sought, it is necessary to determine whether
reporters are entitled to any greater protection under the free press
guarantee of the first amendment.9"
88. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
89. See comments of Governor Ogilvie, supra note 51.
90. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 424. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
91. Conceivably, Warden itself may come again before the court. The grand jury
might call the four attorneys, not discover the source of the transcripts from them, and
again seek to divest Warden of his privilege under the Act. Presumably, Warden would
continue to refuse to disclose his source and the circuit court would have to decide
whether the legal requirements for divestiture had been met. If the courts were to determine that the requirements for divestiture under the statute were met, it would be required to address whether the first amendment protects Warden's sources. The
possibility of this occurring is more than conjectural. Robert Cummins, chairman of the
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, was recently subpoenaed to appear before a special grand
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The Branzburg Decision

The starting point for such a discussion is the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.92 As various
commentators have noted, it is not easy to decipher even the holding in Branzburg.9 3 The plurality opinion, in which Justice White
was joined by three other members of the court, rejected the claim
that the first amendment protects reporters from compelled disclosure of confidential sources.94 For the plurality, the only circumstance which would limit the ability of the state to force disclosure
would be if the demand were made in bad faith or for the purpose
of harassment.95 Four members of the Court dissented. Three dissenters took the position that the first amendment creates a qualified privilege for reporters;96 Justice Douglas argued that the
Constitution erects an absolute barrier against forced disclosure.97
Justice Powell, concurring, cast the deciding vote and, as it turns
out, articulated the test now used by the majority of courts when
deciding whether a reporter must disclose a source. This test calls
for a case by case assessment of the competing interests in requirjury impanelled to investigate the leakage of the transcripts. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 12,
1985, § 3, at 7, col. 1.
92. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). At common law, no reporter's privilege existed. Id. at 685.
Contra Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 424. The first case in which a reporter asserted a constitutional privilege to protect a source was a civil case, in which the court rejected the assertion. See Garland v. Torres, 259 F.2d 545, 549-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910
(1958).
93. See, e.g., Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731, 760-61
(1977); Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege. An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v.
Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 815, 836 (1983).
94. The plurality view of the issue and holding in Branzburg was succinctly summarized by Justice White: "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear
and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not." 408 U.S. at 667.
95. Id. at 707-08.
96. Before the government could compel disclosure, Justices Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshall would have required the government to:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of the law;
(2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative
means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information.
Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
97. Justice Douglas recognized one exception to his absolute privilege rule. If a reporter were alleged to be personally involved in the crime under investigation by the
grand jury, he or she would enjoy no first amendment immunity. Douglas reasoned that
the reporter suspected of wrongdoing could invoke the fifth amendment if called to testify. Because the first and fifth amendment rights would, in Douglas's view, create an
absolute privilege, he would not require a reporter even to appear before a grand jury. Id.
at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ing or not requiring disclosure: "The asserted claim to privilege
should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance
to
between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
98
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.
Most early interpretations of Branzburg focused on Justice
White's plurality opinion and consequently rejected the idea of
constitutional protection for reporters called to testify in criminal
investigations. 99 Later cases emphasized the pivotal role of the
Powell concurring opinion and interpreted Branzburg as having
recognized a qualified reporter's privilege.°0 As a recent commentator on the topic has written: "The now widely accepted view of
Branzburg.

. . is

that it was limited by the specific facts presented

to the Justices in the consolidated cases and that the case-by-case
analysis must be used by trial judges in 'balancing freedom of the
press against a compelling and overriding public interest in the in98. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 913 (1975) (Branzburg provides a qualified privilege in grand jury proceedings
only in situations of harassment or bad faith); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 467, 295
A.2d 3, 6 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973) (Branzburgstated broad rule that the
first amendment provides no privilege to a reporter against appearing before a grand
jury); Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 726, 294 A.2d 149, 157, affd. per curiam, 266
Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973) (no federal constitutional
guarantee against compelled disclosure). For later cases, see also Pankratz v. District
Court, 609 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Colo. 1980) (first amendment does not protect newsman's
agreement to protect his source); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 266, 394 A.2d 330, 333, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 998 (1978) (Supreme Court has "clearly" rejected claim of privilege and
has squarely held that no such first amendment right exists).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) (Branzburg recognized the existence of a first amendment
privilege for newsgathering); U.S. v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (district court must balance the interest of confidentiality against needs of criminal justice
system); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 296 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (state must
make showing of sufficient interest to overcome reporter's constitutional privilege); In re
Pennington, 224 Kan. 573, 575, 581 P.2d 812, 814-15 (1978) (reported sub nom State v.
Sandstrom), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979) (Branzburg acknowledged qualified privilege in criminal cases); State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 259, 444 A.2d 499, 502 (1982)
(Branzburgjustices recognized qualified first amendment privileges for reporters); Brown
v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974) (newsman's privilege is
related to first amendment). These were all criminal cases in which a reporter was asked
to reveal a source.
In an even greater number of civil cases, courts have applied a balancing test. See, e.g.,
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (1st Cir. 1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708,
715-16 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-38 (10th Cir.
1977); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397-98 (D.D.C. 1973); Conn. State.
Bd. v. Fagin, 33 Conn. Sup. 204, 207, 370 A.2d 1095, 1097 (1976); Opinion of the Justices, 117 N.H. 386, 389, 373 A.2d 644, 646 (1977).
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formation sought." ' "'°
The plurality in Branzburg stressed that the reporters in the
cases before it had been called to testify before grand juries investigating serious crimes.° 2 Some courts have cited Branzburg for the
proposition that the state's interest in receiving testimony at a
grand jury proceeding always presents a compelling circumstance
which outweighs competing first amendment

interests. 0

3

A

smaller number of courts, however, have rejected any blanket assertion that the first amendment is inapplicable in the grand jury
setting. " These courts view the fact that a reporter is called to
101. Marcus, supra note 93, at 838 (footnotes omitted).
102. Three cases were consolidated for decision in Branzburg. In Caldwell v. United
States, a New York Times reporter was called to testify before a grand jury investigating
the activities and plans of the Black Panther Party. In particular, the grand jury wanted
to question Caldwell about a reported conversation he had with a high level Black Panther who allegedly said he wanted to kill the President of the United States. In
Branzburg, a reporter who watched and wrote about hashish production was summoned
before a grand jury investigating the use and sale of drugs. In In re Pappas, a grand jury
subpoenaed a television newsman who had been allowed to enter Black Panther headquarters during a period of civil disorder in New Bedford, Massachusetts. Pappas never
wrote a story or otherwise revealed what he saw or heard in the building. For a detailed
discussion of the facts, see Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665, 667-79 (1972).
103. See, e.g., Reporter's Committee v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 593
F.2d 1030, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949 (1979); In re Bridge, 120
N.J. Super. 460, 467, 295 A.2d 3, 6 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973). Many nongrand jury cases distinguish Branzburg on the ground that its holding is limited to grand
jury investigations of crime. Invariably, the court is confronted with a request to recognize the privilege, and its subsequent decision rests on its classification of the proceedings
as either criminal or civil. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(Branzburg, which involved grand jury proceedings, is not controlling in civil cases);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (Branzburg is limited to
the confines of the criminal justice system); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 269, 315 A.2d
254, 255 (1974) (Branzburg confines itself to grand jury proceedings and trials); Zelenka
v. State, 83 Wisc. 2d 601, 618, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286 (1978), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Dean, 103 Wisc. 2d 228, 307 N.W.2d 628 (1981), (Branzburg applies to grand
jury proceedings where the reporter has witnessed a crime). Because they did not involve
grand jury proceedings, these cases typically contain no analysis of the role of the first
amendment in grand jury proceedings.
104. In Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972), the court rejected the
government's argument that persons engaged in newspaper work cannot invoke the first
amendment when called to testify before a grand jury:
No governmental door can be closed against the Amendment. No governmental activity is immune from its force. That the setting for the competition between rights secured by the First Amendment and antagonistic governmental
interests is a grand jury proceeding is simply one of the factors that must be
taken into account in striking the appropriate constitutional balance.
Id. at 1082. See also United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 72 (1983) (same test applied in civil and criminal proceedings); Morgan v. State, 337
So. 2d 951, 954 (Fla. 1976) (limited to grand jury investigations of crime, not grand jury
investigations generally).
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testify before a grand jury as one of the factors to be placed in the

balance.
The latter position represents the preferable approach. First, it

is the approach taken by a majority of the Justices in Branzburg.05
Second, it comports with traditional first amendment principles
which require the state to demonstrate that its interest in dis-

rupting the free flow of information is of the highest order. 0 6 To
establish a conclusive presumption that grand jury investigations
are always of the highest order diminishes the heavy burden placed
on the state to articulate reasons why there is no alternative short

of suppressing speech or the press which will satisfy the state's
interest. 107
In analyzing the scope of the reporter's first amendment privilege in Warden, this article adopts the view that Branzburg requires balancing the press' and public's interest in the free flow of
information about public officials against the state's interest in enforcing its policy of juvenile confidentiality."' 8
105. Justice Powell made it clear that he would apply a balancing test even in the
grand jury context: "The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before
(emphasis added). 408 U.S. at
a grand jury, are without constitutional rights .....
709.
In a footnote, Justice Powell explained his objection to the dissenter's view. Id. at 710.
With respect to reporter Caldwell, Powell rejected his assertion that he need not even
appear before the grand jury prior to a court determination of absolute need. He likewise
rejected the dissenters' position that a reporter could not be required to disclose a source
until after the government had proven certain preconditions. Instead, Powell envisioned
a simple balancing of the "competing interests on their merits in the particular case." Id.
106. The first amendment has a preferred position on the list of freedoms protected
by the Constitution; whenever government action limits first amendment rights, the government bears the burden of proving that its interests are legitimate, compelling, and
designed to infringe on the area of protected activity no more than absolutely necessary.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439-41 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 864-73 (2d ed. 1983).
107. The plurality in Branzburg rejected the concept of a balancing test in the grand
jury context on the grounds that the courts would become "inextricably involved in distinguishing between the value of enforcing different criminal laws." Id. at 706-07.
Outside the grand jury context, however, the Court has frequently imposed this precise
burden on courts where first amendment values are at issue. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (state law prohibiting malicious and wilful disturbing the
peace by offensive conduct held unconstitutional); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47
(1966) (upholding state law prohibiting trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent
upon the premises of a county jail).
108. Although the Illinois Supreme Court did not address Warden's first amendment
argument, it cited Branzburg in its determination of the reporter's rights under the Illinois shield law. See Warden, 104 I11. 2d at 424-28. The court interpreted Branzburg as
"permitting forced disclosure of the reporter's source when the public interest is sufficiently compelling." Id. at 424.
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B.

The Role of a Free Press

The information published in the Chicago Lawyer concerned allegedly inappropriate behavior by a juvenile court judge in the performance of his duties. The press has traditionally acted as the
agent of the people in providing information about the workings of
government and its legal system." °9 A privilege for reporters to
refuse to disclose sources reflects an understanding that the ability
of the press to provide newsworthy information to the public is
lessened if a reporter cannot guarantee confidentiality to sources.
For that reason, the first amendment accords substantial protection to reporters and publications addressing the conduct of public
officials. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the publication
of information relating to the conduct of judges or other public
officials "lies near the core of the [flirst [a]mendment .. ."11o The
amendment was fashioned to protect against offical interference
with criticism of government or public officials.I" This idea is so
entrenched that the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment
as providing a measure of protection even for untruthful speech
directed against government officials. 12
In the context of reporting on the operations of the courts, the
press serves not only as a principal conduit of information essential
to an informed citizenry, but also as a check on abuses of governmental power in the administration of justice." 3 All members of
the Court in Branzburg agreed that the first amendment must pro109. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966), explained the role of the press in a
democracy:
Thus the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any
abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally chosen
means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible to all the people
whom they were selected to serve.
Id. at 219. See also Justice Douglas's dissent in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721
(1972). ("The press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it
to make money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to
the public's right to know.").
110. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978). In
Landmark, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting publication of proceedings before
a state judicial review commission. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 S. Cr. REV.
245 (1961). For Meiklejohn, one of the responsibilities of citizenship is to "pass judgment
upon the decisions which our agents make upon those issues [which face the nation]." Id.
at 255. Full knowledge of the actions by the government agent is essential in carrying out
that responsibility. Id. at 257.
112. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A public official who is
defamed must prove that the allegedly damaging information is untrue and that it was
knowingly or recklessly published with disregard for its truth or falsity.
113. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
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vide some protection to the newsgathering process if the press is to
carry out effectively its intended functions.114 Five of the Justices,
the dissenters and Justice Powell, include freedom from compelled
disclosure of confidential sources as falling within this zone of protection.115 For these Justices, it is only when the state establishes a
compelling need which outweighs the burden placed on the free
flow of information that forced disclosure may be constitutionally
required. ' 16
V.

JUVENILE COURT CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE BALANCE

In Warden, the Illinois Supreme Court was asked to weigh the
interest of the public and press in preserving the anonymity of a
confidential news source against the state's interest in protecting
the confidentiality of juvenile court records. In attempting to understand and evaluate the state's interest in juvenile anonymity in
Warden, the following sections examine the philosophy and history
of juvenile courts, the changing role of confidentiality in that system, and the current Illinois statutory scheme with regard to juvenile anonymity. The section finishes with a review of several cases
decided by the Supreme Court in the last decade in which the
Court, like the Illinois Supreme Court in Warden, was asked to
elevate the state's concern with preserving
juvenile confidentiality
17
over competing constitutional claims.'
A.

Philosophy and History of Juvenile Justice

Although the American juvenile justice system has traditionally
emphasized the importance of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings, Illinois and other states are in the process of reevaluating
their commitment to the concept of anonymity."' To understand
114. Even the plurality opinion in Branzburg recognized that the first amendment
provides some measure of protection for newsmen called on to disclose confidential
sources in grand jury proceedings:
[Nlewsgathering is not without its First Amendment protections, and grand
jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would
pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). For further discussion of the constitutional right of the press to gather newsworthy information, see Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
115. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-52 (1972).
116. Id. See supra notes 96-98.
117. Because of the basis for reversal, the Illinois Supreme Court did not discuss the
balancing of these two competing interests. It did note in dictum, however, that it considered the public interest advanced by the state as sufficiently "compelling" to merit
disclosure under the Illinois Act. Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 425.
118. See infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
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this reassessment, it is important to consider briefly the history of
juvenile courts and their philosophical underpinnings.
Since the early nineteenth century, two principles have guided
legislators, jurists, and child welfare advocates faced with the challenge of transforming "unfortunate" children into productive
members of society. The first principle is that children should be
rehabilitated to prevent future misconduct rather than punished
for past transgressions; the second is that these children are more
likely to be reformed if they are separated from corrupting
influences. 119
The operative theory for accomplishing these goals has been,
and continues to be, the doctrine of parens patriae. 12 ° This doctrine recognizes that while natural parents have a right to parental
control, it is the obligation of the state to intercede and assume the
duties of the parents when they cannot or do not exercise that
right.
In 1899, the Illinois legislature established the first court system
devoted exclusively to children."' The concept of a separate system of justice for children, grounded in the ideology of parens patriae and marked by a goal of rehabilitation rather than
12 2
punishment, was quickly seized upon by other states.
119. Fox, Philosophy and the Principlesof Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8 FAM.
L.Q. 373, 374 (1974).
120. Literally translated as "parent of the country," in the United States the term
parens patriae refers to the state's power to act as a guardian for persons under a disability. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The doctrine was used as a
justification for juvenile court intervention for the first time in Ex ParteCrouse, 4 Whart.
9, 11 (Pa. 1838).
The concept of parens patriae underlay creation, in 1824, of the first specialized juvenile institution in the United States, the New York House of Refuge. Children who were
homeless or neglected, or who had committed petty offenses, were, without procedural
fanfare, committed to the House for an indefinite period of time. Fox, Juvenile Justice
Reform: An HistoricalPerspective, 22 STAN L. REV. 1187, 1190-91 (1970). In upholding
the constitutionality of such an institution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, using a
mode of analysis almost universally accepted by courts, reasoned:
The House of Refuse is not a prison, but a school. . . . The object of charity is
reformation, by training its inmates to industry; by imbuing their minds with
principles of morality and religion; by furnishing them with means to earn a
living; and, above all, by separating them from the corrupting influence of improper associates. To this end may not the natural parents when unequal to the
task of education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, or
common guardian of the community?
Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1838).
121. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
122. By 1925, all but two states had established a juvenile court system. Today, all
states have a separate system of justice for minors. See Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court
Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101, 105 (1958).
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The first Illinois Juvenile Court Act incorporated theories of
child treatment which had been developed over the course of the
nineteenth century. These included the desirability of procedural
informality and broad judicial discretion, the need for individualized treatment, the inapplicability of concepts of retribution and
deterrence, the importance of social science professionals in the juvenile process, and the corresponding absence of a role for
lawyers. 123

While many hailed the development of a separate system of justice for children,' 24 others argued that the system created for minors what Justice Fortas was later to call "the worst of both worlds
. . .neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."' 125 In
1967, a presidential commission highlighted many of the factors
which have kept juvenile courts from accomplishing their long
127
stated rehabilitative mission. 126 That same year, in In re Gault,
the United States Supreme Court cited the disparity between the
philosophy and the reality of American juvenile justice, and ruled
that many of the procedural safeguards available to adults in criminal cases are equally applicable in juvenile delinquency pro12

ceedings.

123. See generally Beckham, Helpful Practices in Juvenile Court Hearings, 13 FED.
PROBATION 10 (1949), reprinted in F. MCCARTHY & J. CARR, JUVENILE LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES, 53-58 (1980); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). See
also Fox, supra note 120, at 1212-22.
124. For a collection of materials by early exponents of the juvenile court, see THE
PROBLEMS OF JUVENILE COURTS AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1-32 (M. Paulsen, ed.
1975).
125. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). In Kent, the Court, relying on
the District of Columbia juvenile statute and judicial precedent, held that the minor was
entitled to a hearing in connection with a prosecutor's petition to transfer the minor's
case to adult court. In addition, the Court ruled that counsel for the minor had a right of
access to any written materials relied on by the court in its decision and that the juvenile
had a right to a written statement of reasons for the decision to waive juvenile court
jurisdiction. See generally Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems
of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7 (1965).
126. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 1, 7-9
(1967). The Task Force attributed the failure of the juvenile courts to achieve their goal
of rehabilitating children and decreasing delinquency to lack of adequate knowledge
about the phenomenon of delinquency, an inadequate commitment by states to provide
resources to accomplish the mission of the courts, and the lack of procedural safeguards
for ensuring a fair outcome in juvenile proceedings.
127. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
128. Id. In Gault, the Court held that due process requires that, in the adjudicatory
phase of a delinquency proceeding, a child is entitled to notice of the charges, the right to
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Since 1966, the Supreme Court has decided six major cases
which establish a constitutional framework within which juvenile
delinquency proceedings must operate. 129 In addition to the procedural reforms announced in Gault, the Court has held that the
state has the burden of proving delinquency beyond a reasonable
doubt, 30 and that the concept of double jeopardy
applies in delin13
quency as well as in criminal proceedings. 1
Although the reasoning of these opinions suggested that all procedural rights guaranteed to an adult offender might also be available to minors charged in delinquency petitions, 3 2 the Supreme
Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 33 rejected the theory that a
wholesale transference of rights was mandated by the Constitution.
Rather, the Court held that questions of due process in juvenile
cases should be decided on a case by case basis, weighing the detriment to the child in not requiring a given procedure against the
harm to the nonadversarial nature of juvenile proceedings if the
procedure were required.' 34 In applying this balancing test, the
Court in McKeiver held that the right to trial by jury is not constitutionally required in juvenile cases. The Court reasoned that the
primary purpose of a jury is to assure an unbiased factfinder and
that to assume that bias is a serious problem in juvenile court ignores "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of
35
paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.'
The Supreme Court's introduction of criminal procedure into
delinquency proceedings has not been the only response to the perceived failure of the juvenile court system. Academicians and
policymakers have also reacted by questioning the ongoing validity
of a court system grounded in the concepts of rehabilitation and
counsel, the rights of confrontation and cross-examination, and the right to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 33, 36, 55.
129. Schall v. Martin, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In addition, see
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (a minor's request to see his probation officer
during custodial interrogation is not a per se invocation of Miranda rights).
130. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
131. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975).
132. The rationale for the opinions was summarized by Justice Fortas in Gault: "A
boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed to an institution where he may be
restrained of liberty for years. . . . In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our
Constitution did not require the procedural regularity .. .implied in the phrase 'due
process.' " 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967).
133. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
134. Id. at 545.
135. Id. at 550.
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separation. 3 6 These concerns have been translated into a variety
of concrete suggestions, some of which are currently being adopted
in revised juvenile codes. Many states, for example, are in the process of abolishing or reducing juvenile court jurisdiction over status
offenses on the theory that the courts have done more harm than
good in this area. 137 Others have tightened their definitions of
court intervention only in seriabuse and neglect, thereby ensuring
13
ous cases of parental misconduct.

1

In delinquency cases, increased statutory attention is being paid
to the rights of the public in juvenile cases. This development is in
response to the general alarm expressed over statistics which reveal
a disproportionate percentage of serious crime committed by
youthful offenders.1 39 The Illinois Juvenile Court Act contains several provisions which exemplify the increased attention being given
to public safety concerns in state legislative enactments. For example, dispositional provisions in the Act were recently amended to
introduce criminal justice concepts of sentencing into the delinquency process. Under traditional principles of juvenile justice,
only the rehabilitative needs of the child could determine what dispositional alternative a court should select. The Illinois Act now
provides that a child who has been adjudicated a delinquent and
made a ward of the court may be committed to the Department of
Corrections if such a commitment is in the best interests of the
child or if "it is necessary to insure the protection of the public
from the consequences of criminal activity of the delinquent."' I
Additionally, Illinois, like most states, permits transfer of a case
to adult criminal court for trial if the best interests of the child or
136. Current critics base their objections on one of two premises: (1) juvenile courts
continue to abuse, to an unacceptable degree, the children and families they were
designed to help; and (2) the present juvenile system has failed to protect adequately the
interests of society. See Fox, supra note 119, at 375; Guggenheim, A Call to Abolish the
Juvenile Justice System, 11 CHILDREN'S RTs. REP. No. 9 (June, 1978).
137. Illinois, for example, recently amended its Act to provide for a cooling-off period
during which the youth is offered services before the juvenile court obtains jurisdiction
702-3 (1983). See also Utah Code Ann.
over the child. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 9A:78-3a-19 (1977). For a discussion of the pros and cons of abolishing juvenile court
involvement in status offense cases, see S. Fox, MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE, 507-35 (2d
ed. 1981).
138. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN., § 827.07 (West 1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 702-4 (1983). See also, M. Ward, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected' Children:
A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1975).
139. National Crime Survey and FBI arrest statistics indicate that approximately one
in five violent crimes committed between 1974 and 1979 were committed by juveniles.
For a detailed survey on juvenile violent crime statistics, see Snyder, Violent Juvenile
Crime: The Problem in Perspective, 1 TODAY'S DELINQUENT 7 (1982).
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 705-10 (1) (1983).
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the public require it. ' 4 1 In cases involving certain serious crimes,42
the legislature has divested the juvenile court of all jurisdiction.
The serious nature of the alleged offense itself warrants trial as an
adult, without regard to the rehabilitative prognosis or individualized treatment needs of the particular child.
In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned
the use of public safety factors in the juvenile process. At issue in
Schall v. Martin143 was the constitutionality of a New York statute
which permits a child to be held in preventive detention awaiting
trial in order to protect the child and society from the possibility
that the child will commit another crime.'" The Court conceded
that it has never held that it would be constitutionally permissible
to detain an adult criminal defendant awaiting trial for any reason
other than to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial, 4 ' but
nonetheless upheld the New York scheme for protecting the public
and the child from future criminal activity, emphasizing that it is
the parens patriae role of the juvenile court 46which authorizes differential treatment for adults and children.
Schall will undoubtedly be read by many as a return to a preGault philosophy which permits the state to deprive a child of his
or her liberty under circumstances which would not justify detention if the accused were an adult. 47 Before Gault, however, only
the child's best interest could justify differential treatment; after
Schall, the public's interest in safety can apparently be constitutionally considered by the state as long as adequate procedural pro4
tections are provided. 1
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-7(3) (1983) provides, in relevant part:
If a petitioner alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of an act
which constitutes a crime. . . and, on motion of the State's Attorney, a Juvenile
Judge. . . after investigation and hearing. . . finds that it is not in the best
interest of the minor or of the public to proceed under this Act, the court may
enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal law.
142, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 705-10(6)(a) (1983). A case is automatically transferred from juvenile court for trial in criminal court if the minor is older than 15 and is
charged with murder, rape, deviate sexual assault, or armed robbery with a firearm. The
Illinois Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of this statute. People v.
J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395 (1984).
143. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
144. N.Y. FAM. Cr. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
145. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979).
146. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984).
147. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
148. Under the New York detention statute, when a probation officer decides to refer
a case to juvenile court, his or her petition must include a recommendation as to whether
the child should be detained pending adjudication. Within 24 hours of being detained,
the child is entitled to a hearing similar to an arraignment hearing in adult court. The
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The Role of Anonymity in the Juvenile System
1. The History of Confidentiality

Although the Illinois Act of 1899 mandated creation of juvenile
records and provided for court hearings,' 4 9 it made no reference to
confidentiality in juvenile cases. As the system of juvenile justice
was implemented on a larger scale, however, anonymity of juvenile
proceedings was advocated as an essential ingredient of rehabilitation. By the 1920's, both the federal government's Children's Bureau and the National Probation and Parole Association adopted
0
standards calling for closed proceedings and sealed records. 5
In the 1950's, the press and law enforcement officials began asserting the right of the public to know who was committing crime
on the nation's streets and what was happening in the nation's
courtrooms.'
The campaign against juvenile court anonymity
met with measured success. Some states opened their juvenile
records and proceedings to public or press scrutiny, 1 2 while others
moved from a policy of mandatory closure to a system giving the
judge discretion over the question of publicity. 153 Today, a wide
variety of statutory schemes exist for implementation of the policy
of confidentiality in juvenile cases. 154
minor is advised of the charges and of his or her rights; the judge may make inquiries of
the child's appointed counsel, prosecutor or probation officer. The judge then announces
his or her decision and makes a statement of reasons for the record. If a child is detained,
a trial on the merits is scheduled to take place within three to six days. If the trial is not
held within that period, a probable cause hearing must be held within the three days of
the detention hearing. N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (McKinney 1983).
149. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 I11.Laws 131, § 3:
A special court room to be designated as the juvenile court room, shall be provided for the hearing of such cases, and the findings of the court shall be entered
in a book or books to be kept for that purpose and known as the "Juvenile
Record."
150. Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101,
114 (1958).
151. Geis, supra note 150, at 120. According to Geis, FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover
was at the forefront of the movement to publicize the names and crimes of juvenile delinquents and to make public juvenile records. Id.
152. Id. at 121.
153. Id.
154. For a detailed listing and description of statutes restricting access to juvenile
proceedings as a way of ensuring confidentiality, see Comment, Delinquency Hearings
and the FirstAmendment.- Reassessing Juvenile Court Confidentiality Upon the Demise of
'Confidential Access,' 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 123, 124 n.5 (1979). For a statute limiting
access to records, see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-9 (1982), infra note 160. See
also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Standard 5.414 (1976).
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The Illinois Statutory Scheme

The Illinois Juvenile Court Act has long given expression to the
belief that involvement in the juvenile court system should confer
no badge of infamy.1 55 Until 1965, however, it made only oblique
reference to the confidentiality of juvenile records and no reference
at all to the confidentiality of court proceedings. 156 In that year,
Illinois made major revisions in its juvenile code and enacted two
new provisions aimed specifically at publicity in juvenile cases.
The first excluded the public but permitted the press to attend all
court proceedings; 15 the second required the impoundment of
records and prior court approval before access would be allowed. 5 ' An amendment in 1977 empowered the court to bar
those present at a hearing from disclosing the minor's identity. 151609
These provisions remain the cornerstones of the Illinois Act.
The remaining provisions regarding anonymity include those relat155. Beginning with the original Act, the vocabulary chosen to describe the juvenile
justice process intentionally eschewed terms used in the criminal justice system. These
terms include "delinquency," "adjudication," "taking into custody," and "disposition."
In 1905, the Act was amended to provide that the fact a child was adjudicated a delinquent in juvenile court could not be introduced as evidence in a subsequent judicial proceeding. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, 169 (1905).
156. A 1949 amendment permitted a criminal court judge to review juvenile court
records for a limited purpose with the consent of the juvenile court judge. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 23,
190 (1941). This is the first reference to the confidentiality of juvenile
records.
157. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 701-20(6) (1965).
158. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-10 (1965).
159. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 701-20(6) (1977).
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 701-20(6) (1983). The provision on media access to
proceedings reads as follows:
The general public except the news media and the victim shall be excluded
from any hearing and, except for the persons specified in this Section, only persons, including representatives of agencies and associations, who in the opinion
of the court have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court shall be
admitted to the hearing. However, the court may, for the minor's protection
and for good cause shown, prohibit any person or agency present in court from
further disclosing the minor's identity.
701-20(6) does not differentiate, for purposes of press access, among the types of proceedings before the court (i.e., delinquency, minor requiring authoritative intervention,
neglect, abuse, or dependency), nor does it differentiate among the stages of a proceeding
(i.e., detention or shelter hearing, adjudication, disposition).
The provision on access to juvenile court records provides:
702-9. Confidentiality and Accessibility of Juvenile Court Records.
A. Inspection and copying of juvenile court records relating to a minor who
is the subject of a proceeding under this Act shall be restricted to the following:
(1) The minor who is the subject of record, his parents, guardian and counsel.
(2) Law enforcement officers and law enforcement agencies when such in-
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ing to law enforcement records 16 1 and expungement of juvenile
formation is essential to executing an arrest or search warrant or other compulsory process, or to conducting an ongoing investigation.
(3) Judges, prosecutors, probation officers, social workers, or other individuals assigned by the court to conduct a pre-adjudication or pre-disposition investigation, and individuals responsible for supervising or providing temporary
or permanent care and custody for minors pursuant to the order of the Juvenile
Court when essential to performing their responsibilities.
(4) Judges, prosecutors, probation officers:
(a) In the course of a trial when institution of criminal proceedings have
been permitted under Section 2-7 [footnotes omitted] or required under Section
2-7; or
(b) When criminal proceedings have been permitted under Section 2-7 or
required under Section 2-7 and a minor is the subject of a proceeding to determine the amount of bail; or
(c) When criminal proceedings have been permitted under Section 2-7 or
required under Section 2-7 and a minor is the subject of a pre-trial investigation,
pre-sentence investigation, fitness hearing, or proceedings on an application for
probation; or
(d) When a minor becomes 17 years of age or older, and is the subject of
criminal proceedings, including a hearing to determine the amount of bail, a
pre-trial investigation, a pre-sentence investigation, a fitness hearing, or proceedings on an application for probation.
(5) Adult and Juvenile Prisoner Review Boards.
(6) Authorized military personnel.
(7) Victims, their subrogees and legal representatives; however, such persons shall have access only to the name and address of the minor and the disposition of the Juvenile Court proceeding.
(8) Persons engaged in bona fide research, with the permission of the presiding judge of the Juvenile Court and the chief executive of the agency that
prepared the particular records; provided that publication of such research results in no disclosure of a minor's identity and protects the confidentiality of the
record.
B. Juvenile court records shall not be made available to the general public
but may be inspected by representatives of agencies, associations and news media or other properly interested persons by general or special order of court.
The State's Attorney, the minor, his parents, guardian and counsel shall at all
times have the right to examine court files and records.
C. Nothing in this Section shall affect the right of a Civil Service Commission or appointing authority examining the character and fitness of an applicant
for a position as a law enforcement officer to ascertain whether that applicant
was ever adjudicated to be a delinquent minor, and, if so, to examine the
records of disposition or evidence which were made in proceedings under this
Act.
D. Following any adjudication of delinquency for a crime which would be a
felony if committed by an adult, the State's Attorney shall ascertain whether the
minor respondent is enrolled in school and, if so, shall provide a copy of the
dispositional order to the principal or chief administrative officer of the school.
Access to such juvenile records shall be limited to the principal or chief administrative officer of the school and any guidance counselor designated by him.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
702-9 (1983).
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-10 (1983), detailing the use of juvenile court
evidence and adjudications in other judicial proceedings.
161. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-8 (1983). Law enforcement records are generally
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court records. 1

3.

Present Status of Confidentiality

The policy of anonymous juvenile proceedings and records has
always been closely tied to the rehabilitative premise of the juvenile
courts. Proponents of confidentiality have identified several ways
in which a policy of protecting children from public scrutiny aids
the regenerative efforts of the system. By hiding "youthful errors
from the full gaze of the public and bury[ing] them in the graveyard of the forgotten past,"' 163 children and their families are not
stigmatized by their involvement in the juvenile court. Stigma impedes development of a child's self-esteem and imposes a form of
punishment in a system of justice supposedly free from retribution.' 64 Anonymity also eases a child's reintegration into his own
community and deters future employers and others from denying
the minor benefits and opportunities on the basis of a juvenile "record.' ' 165 Finally, confidentiality prevents a delinquent child who
craves attention from achieving heightened status as166a result of his
or her publicized involvement in criminal activity.
These articulated advantages of anonymity are grounded in a
juvenile justice philosophy which sees rehabilitation of the child as
the major goal of the system. As the rehabilitative model has come
under attack from liberals and conservatives alike, 167 the debate
over the value of confidentiality has been rekindled. The tradiclosed to the public and must be maintained separately from adult arrest records. Access
is available to any law enforcement officer investigating a felony, to prosecutors and probation officers, to those preparing social service reports on the juvenile for the juvenile
court, and for a number of uses if the minor is transferred to adult court.
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-11 (1983). This provision provides a mechanism
for petitioning the court for expungement of juvenile court and law enforcement records
under specified circumstances.
163. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967) (quoting from Arizona Supreme Court opinion in In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965)).
164. See, e.g., Gardner, Publicity and the Juvenile Delinquent, 15 Juv. CT. JUDGES' J.
29 (1964). Howard, Grisso, and Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 209-10 (1977). For a thorough treatment of the literature on
the effects of labelling a child a delinquent, see Comment, Delinquency Hearingsand the
First Amendment, supra note 154, at 153-55 nn.112-17.
165. See Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons, 23 MONT. L. REV. 141,
155 (1962); McIntyre, Juvenile Court Proceedings: The Conflict Between Juvenile Anonymity and Freedom of the Press, 23 S. TEXAS L.J. 383, 389 (1982).
166. In drafting the UNIF. JUVENILE COURT AcT, the Commissioners declined to
follow the trend toward increased publicity in juvenile court, citing their belief that publicity rewards a delinquent child with the recognition he or she sought when originally
committing the delinquent act. 9A U.L.A. 33 (1979).
167. See Hutzler, Cannon to the Left, Cannon to the Right: Can the Juvenile Court
Survive? 1 TODAY'S DELINQUENT 25 (1982).
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tional policy of anonymity has always hampered efforts by the
press to observe and report on the activities of the juvenile court.
This impediment has in part been justified on the theory that confidentiality fosters the informal, "just between you and me" vision of
juvenile justice. ' 6 Now that juvenile adjudications substantially
resemble criminal trials, arguments supporting open trials and
records in criminal cases seem equally applicable in juvenile proceedings. 69 Further, the public's interest in juvenile court has accelerated in recent years as a result of increased attention to the
problem of juvenile crime.' 70 A policy of juvenile court confidentiality, however, denies the public access to its most ready source of'
information about juvenile justice.
Aside from arguments which favor openness from a public and
press perspective, "law and order" critics who favor introduction
of criminal law concepts of retribution and deterrence into the juvenile process also see publicity as an effective technique for controlling anti-social behavior.' 7 ' According to these critics,
publicizing the names of juveniles would subject minors who commit crimes to the same adverse exposure which adult criminals
168. Schramm, The Judge Meets the Boy and His Family, Nat. Prob. Assoc., 1945 YB.
982-94 (1945).
169. One commentator noted:
Open trials '[permit] the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the
judicial process,' [footnote omitted] thereby discouraging decisions based on
partiality or secret bias. Moreover, public trials serve as a forum of legal education for the public, providing an understanding of the legal system in general
and the procedures and rules of law in a particular case. Finally, open trials
provide an outlet for community concern over crime and increase respect for
the law and the judicial process. All of these benefits of public scrutiny in criminal trials are equally applicable to juvenile hearings.
Todd, The Right of Access and Juvenile Delinquency Hearings: The Future of Confidentiality, 16 IND. L. REV. 911, 937 (1983). See also Jonas, Press Access to the Juvenile Courtroom: Juvenile Anonymity and the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS.,
287, 339-45 (1982).
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutionally protected right of access based
on the value of open criminal trials. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S.
Ct. 819, 825 (1984) (the court held that the guarantees of an open trial extend to voir dire
examinations); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982) (Massachusetts statute which required closure of a rape trial during the testimony of a minor
rape victim held unconstitutional); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 580 (1980) (in a plurality opinion with seven separate opinions the Court upheld the
right of the public and press to attend criminal trials). But see Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 385, 394 (1979) in which the Court refused to permit the press or
public to attend a pretrial suppression hearing after the defendant, prosecutor and judge
agreed to a closed hearing to protect the accused's right to a fair trial.
170. See supra notes 139, 164-66 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Campbell, Feathersin the Aquarium and Fish Scales in the Bird Cage:
One Judge's Personal View of the Juvenile Justice System, 1 J. Juv. L. 79, 83, 86 (1977).
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now face. "2 Other juveniles might be deterred from criminal activity if they knew the consequences of their actions, and embarrassed
parents might place greater controls on the behavior of their chil7 3
dren in order to save the family from public humiliation.
Along with other states, the Illinois General Assembly has responded to the mounting pressure to lift the veil of secrecy surrounding juvenile proceedings. Although juvenile court and law
enforcement records are still shielded from general public scrutiny,
they are now available for inspection and copying, without prior
court approval, to a greatly expanded list of persons or groups with
institutional or personal interest in the information contained in a
minor's file.' 7 4 Included on this roster are victims and their legal
75
representatives,

military

personnel,

and probation

officers.

Under recent amendments, state's attorneys are now under an affirmative duty to send a copy of a dispositional order to school
officials in any case in which a child has been found involved
in a
76
crime which would be a felony if committed by an adult.
Press access has constituted a recognized exception to the confidentiality policies of the juvenile courts since 1965.77 In that year,
the Illinois General Assembly amended the Juvenile Court Act to
allow the press access to all stages of all juvenile court proceedings.

7

The Illinois Attorney General has commented on this stat-

utory provision:
It is implicit from the legislative authorization to news media to
attend juvenile proceedings that the reporters in attendance
would report what they saw and heard. Any attempt by the juvenile court to restrict publication would amount to a prior restraint on publication, which 9 can only be exercised where a
17
substantive evil would result.
Illinois case law has also acknowledged the fundamental role of
the press in the juvenile justice system. Although Illinois gives leg172. Id. at 86.
173. See Comment, Delinquincy Hearingsand the FirstAmendment, supra note 54, at
162 & 162 n.40. For a contrary view of the relationship between publicity and deterrence, see Geis, In re: Juvenile Court Publicity, 16 Juv. CT. JUDGES' J. 12, 13 (1965).
174. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-9 (1983), set forth supra note 160.
175. Id. at 702-9(A)(3), (4), (6), (7).
176. Id. at 702-9(D).
177. Approved Aug. 5, 1965, L. 1965, p. 2585, S.B. No. 388. Effective Jan. 1, 1966.
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 701-20(6) (1983).
179. 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. S-645. The Attorney General's position that a state
law prohibiting the press from publishing the identity of a juvenile would violate the
federal constitution was confirmed in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97
(1979). See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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islative recognition to the benefits of anonymity in the rehabilitative process, the policy of the state in fact favors accessibility over
anonymity in the juvenile courts. For instance, in In re Jones,18°
the Illinois Supreme Court considered a case involving a conflict
between the public's right to be informed about the operations of
its juvenile courts and a juvenile's right to protect himself or herself from adverse publicity. In Jones, a sixteen year old delinquent
asked the juvenile court to close his hearing to the press. When the
court refused, the juvenile entered an admission rather than run
the risk of further negative publicity."' On appeal, he challenged
the court's decision allowing the press to remain. Citing the statutory provision on press access to juvenile hearings, the Illinois
Supreme Court indicated:
[I]t is clear that the legislature intended that openness should
prevail throughout the proceedings. We are of the opinion that
Section 1-20(6) serves the dual function of not only protecting a
respondent's right to a 'public trial' but also preserves the right of
82
the general populace to know what is transpiring in its courts. 1

C. The Supreme Court and Juvenile Anonymity
In Gault, the State of Arizona argued that if it were forced to
provide detailed written charges against a minor, the state's goal of
preserving the anonymity of the child would be thwarted.8 3
Although recognizing the potential rehabilitative value in shielding
a juvenile from adverse publicity, the United States Supreme Court
nonetheless held that due process requires that a child be given
timely and adequate notice of the charges filed.' 84
On several occasions in the last decade, the Court has weighed
the state's interest in confidentiality against other constitutional
claims. Significantly, on each occasion the Court, although recognizing the validity of the state's interest in confidentiality, has
subordinated that interest to the constitutional claim asserted.
The first of these cases, Davis v. Alaska,' 5 involved an effort by a
defendant in a criminal case to impeach a key prosecution witness
on the basis of the witness's juvenile delinquency record. The trial
court, citing the state's juvenile anonymity statute, blocked the
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

46 Ill.2d 506, 263 N.E.2d 863 (1970).
Id. at 508, 263 N.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 509, 263 N.E.2d at 864 (emphasis in original).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 33.
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
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proposed line of questioning. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ruling violated the defendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation of witnesses. The state's interest in protecting the
witness from the "temporary embarrassment"'8 6 which might follow from public disclosure of his juvenile court involvement could
not overcome this right.
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,8

7

the Court

weighed the state's interest in shielding the identity of a child
charged with second degree murder against the first amendment
right of the press to publish the name and picture of the minor.
The Oklahoma statute closed juvenile hearings unless the trial
judge specifically ordered that a case be opened to the public. 88
Although no express order opening the proceedings was entered,
neither the court nor the parties objected to the presence of the
press at a detention hearing. After the hearing, the child's name
and photograph appeared in several newspapers and television reports. The juvenile judge then issued a restraining order prohibiting the press from further broadcast of the name and picture of the
child. Press representatives challenged the order as a prior restraint, and the Court agreed, concluding that the press cannot be
restrained from publishing truthful information which it has obtained in open court proceedings.' 9 The juvenile hearing was open
because the press was present with the knowledge of the court.
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 90 while not a case
involving juvenile anonymity, is relevant to a discussion of the
scope of the state's right to place limits on the distribution of information it considers confidential. In Landmark, a criminal charge
was brought against a newspaper owner for publishing an article
186. Id. at 319.
187. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
188. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § I11 (West 1979): "The... hearings shall be private unless specifically ordered by the judge to be conducted in public .... "
189. 430 U.S. at 310-11. Relying on its previous decisions in Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976), the Court held that a state may not suppress evidence obtained in the course of a
public proceeding. Although Oklahoma juvenile proceedings are generally closed to the
public, the Court noted:
Whether or not the trial judge expressly made such an order, members of the
press were in fact present at the hearing with the full knowledge of the presiding
judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel. No objection was made to the
presence of the press in the court room or to the photographing of the juvenile
as he left the courthouse. There is no evidence that petitioner acquired the
information unlawfully or even without the State's implicit approval.
Id. at 311.
190. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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which disclosed the name of the judge whose conduct was being
investigated in a pending judicial inquiry. State law provided that
all records and hearings before the investigating commission were
to be kept confidential.' 9' It is unclear how the newspaper obtained the information it published, although the story was accurate and the Court emphasized that the newspaper itself was not
accused of purloining the information. 192 In challenging his conviction, the newspaper owner contended that the first amendment
protected his right to publish truthful, lawfully obtained information without the threat of subsequent prosecution. The Court
unanimously agreed and reversed the conviction. 93
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.' 94 expanded the scope of
prior decisions discussing the right of the press to publish information in violation of state confidentiality policies. At issue in Smith
was the constitutionality of a criminal statute which prohibited
publication of a child's name without prior approval from the juvenile court. Newspapers published a fourteen-year old murder suspect's name after learning it from eyewitnesses at the scene of the
crime. Reporters had learned of the shooting by listening to a local
police band radio frequency. In a proceeding to bar prosecution
under the statute, the newspapers claimed that a juvenile court
statute which requires prior court approval before a child's name
can be published constitutes a violation of the first amendment.
The Court declined to decide whether the statute was an unlawful
prior restraint or a subsequent punishment, ruling that in either
event the state is required to demonstrate an overriding justification for the suppression or sanction of otherwise truthful
information.' 95
VI.

BALANCING CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN WARDEN

The United States Supreme Court cases on juvenile confidentiality hold that a state may neither restrain nor punish the media for
dissemination of information in the public domain which identifies
a juvenile. This is true whether the information came to the media
as a result of press attendance at juvenile hearings, 96 through
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 830 n.1.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 845-46.
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Id. at 101-02.
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam).
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outside investigation,

97

or through improper disclosure to the

press by a third party. 98 In Warden, of course, the state sought
neither to restrain publication of information nor to punish Warden directly for what he wrote. Warden represents, however, as
strong a case as any heard by the United States Supreme Court to
date for weighing first amendment values more heavily than state
concerns regarding juvenile anonymity.
In assessing the role of the press and the magnitude of the governmental interest in requiring the reporter in Warden to disclose
his source, three introductory points are relevant. First, because
neither Warden nor Warren revealed the identity of the minors
involved in the cases, no specific injury was done to any minor
entitled to confidentiality under the Juvenile Court Act. 99 Any
harm done by release of the transcripts to the press was to the
generalized interest of the state in preventing the disclosure in future cases of a juvenile's identity.2 "o Second, Warden is not a case
where a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial
is jeopardized by a reporter's refusal to divulge sources of information. Many cases requiring disclosure have relied heavily on the
fact that the rights of the accused were in the balance.2"' Finally,
there is no allegation that Warden personally participated in any
wrongdoing. He is not accused of having witnessed or joined in
criminal activity, nor did he refuse to appear before the grand
jury.2" 2 In Branzburg, by contrast, each reporter was allegedly an
eyewitness to serious criminal activity under investigation by a
grand jury.20 3 One reporter refused even to respond to the grand
jury's subpoena, arguing that his appearance could be required
only after a specific finding of a compelling need for his appearance
and testimony.2 °4
In Warden, the state alleged that the constitutional and statutory right of Illinois citizens to know what is transpiring in juvenile
197. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
198. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
199. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Juvenile
Court Act, No. MR-10, slip op. at 3 (Circuit Court of DuPage County, May 23, 1984);
Warden, 104 Ill.2d at 428-30 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
200. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violations of the Juvenile
Court Act, No. MR-10, slip op. at 3 (Circuit Court of DuPage County May 23, 1984).
201. See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976); Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 213-14, 124 Cal. Rptr.
427, 442 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
202. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 102.
204. 408 U.S. 665, 676 (1972).
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courts should be subordinated to the state policy favoring confidential juvenile records. Although protecting the anonymity of
juveniles is a valid state concern,2 °5 in the context of Warden,
where the right of the public to information regarding the conduct
of its judiciary is at stake, it is insufficient to overcome that right
for two reasons. First, denial of press access to transcripts of juvenile court proceedings is inconsistent with state policy favoring media attendance at juvenile proceedings. Second, the state's interest
in confidentiality is not compelling because its goal can be achieved
in ways which cut less intrusively into first amendment freedoms.
As recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Jones, the
primary thrust of the statutory provision which invites the press to
attend and report about all juvenile court proceedings conducted in
the state is to permit the public to scrutinize the activities of its
juvenile court system. 2°6 The records section of the Act, as it relates to a ban on press access to juvenile hearing transcripts, is inconsistent with that objective. Under this provision, the press is
denied access to virtually the same information it is encouraged to
obtain through court attendance. 20 7 The state's interest in juvenile
confidentiality, then, does not appear to be compelling because
other state policies encourage media access to juvenile proceedings.
A reporter's constitutional privilege to refuse to disclose a confidential source should not be divested in order to pursue violations
of a provision which is at odds with fundamental legislative and
judicial policy favoring the right of the public to know about its
juvenile courts and the children brought before them.
Finally, the state's interest in preserving confidentiality can be
achieved in ways which interfere less with the ability of the press to
inform the public about the workings of juvenile courts.2 ° s One
alternative would be to establish a practice of referring to juveniles
205. Although the Supreme Court has called state juvenile confidentiality policies
"more rhetoric than reality," (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967)), it has nonetheless
recognized the state's interest in confidentiality. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979).
206. See In re Jones, 46 Ill.2d 500, 263 N.E.2d 863 (1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37,
701-20(6) (1983), supra note 160. The judge may, however, order the press not to report
the minor's identity "for the minor's protection or for good cause shown." Id. See also
1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. S-645 (implicit legislative authorization for reporters to attend
juvenile hearings and report what they see).
207. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 702-9 (1983), supra note 160.
208. When fundamental constitutional rights such as those protected by the first
amendment are at issue, the state must show that no reasonable and adequate alternatives
are available for accomplishing the state's objectives. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963).

1984]

Confidentiality Policies

in court proceedings by first name and last initial only.20 9 In the
unusual instance where the record contains identifying information
other than a name, that information could be deleted prior to filing
the transcript with the clerk.
A second less restrictive approach to press access to records
would be to adopt a process for sealing juvenile transcripts based
on a showing in a particular case that press access to the transcript
would impede the rehabilitation of a child. In another context, the
Supreme Court has approved of this approach to balancing the respective interests of the press and the state when the state seeks to
2 10
protect the identity or sensibilities of a minor appearing in court.
Another alternative would be to expedite the process for expunging juvenile records so that breaches of confidentiality are less
likely to occur. 21 1 Finally, the state can more directly attack the
problem of misuse of information regarding a juvenile's "record"
by outlawing its improper uses. For example, a state law making it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to make an employment
decision on the basis of an applicant's involvement in juvenile court
is a way of protecting job and educational opportunities for minors
without raising first amendment concerns.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Warden represents the Illinois Supreme Court's first effort at addressing the complex question of when the news media can be compelled to disclose information it has obtained in the course of
newsgathering activities. In Warden, the court reversed a lower
court order divesting a reporter of his privilege under the Illinois
shield law. The court concluded that the state failed to comply
with the statutory provision which requires that all other available
sources of the information sought be exhausted. The court
adopted a balancing test to determine the showing required of a
party seeking divestiture in order to meet the statutory exhaustion
requirement.
209. This is, of course, the practice already universally adopted by courts in reporting
juvenile court cases.
210. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608-11 (1982), the
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts law which required that the press be excluded from a sex offense trial during the testimony of a minor victim. The Court objected to the mandatory nature of the statute, suggesting courts should determine
whether state's interest in protecting the minor victim might outweigh the right of the
press to be present in court on a case-by-case basis. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND

J.N.

YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

922 (2d ed. 1983).

211. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violation of the Juvenile
Court Act, No. MR-10, slip op. at 3 (Circuit Court of DuPage County May 23, 1984).
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Although the narrow issue in Warden appears to have been correctly decided, the court's opinion fails to give clear guidance for
courts called upon in the future to decide whether a reporter can be
forced to reveal a source. Specifically, questions remain concerning the appropriate interpretation of the "essential to the public
interest" prong of the divestiture statute, and the role of the first
amendment in protecting a reporter's confidential sources.
This article takes the position that the first amendment free press
guarantee requires a court to balance the interest of the public in
an unfettered press against the need for the information sought
whenever a reporter is asked to reveal a source. Use of this approach under the facts in Warden involves weighing the public's
right to information regarding alleged official misconduct by a juvenile court judge against the state's interest in denying media access to juvenile court records. Although the continued wisdom of
protecting the anonymity of children in the juvenile court system is
under debate, this article takes no position on the desirability of
such a policy. Rather, it focuses on the question of whether the
state's interest in preserving an existing policy of juvenile confidentiality is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the right of the press
to receive and report on information of vital interest to the public.
It concludes that it is not and suggests ways in which the state's
commitment to assuring juvenile anonymity can be maintained
without interfering unduly with the right of the public to know.

